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Chapter 7. 
 
THE KLAN IS HISTORY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE REVIVAL OF THE FAR-
RIGHT IN ‘POST-RACIAL’ AMERICA 
Aaron Winter 
 
 
With the election of Barack Obama as the first black president, discussion inside and beyond the United States 
focused on the legacy of civil rights and the possibility of a ‘post-racial’ America. Discussion and images of 
Obama were often juxtaposed with historical references to and images of slavery, Jim Crow segregation, civil 
rights activists and the Ku Klux Klan.1  Post-racial discourses rely on both a historical narrative of unidirectional 
progress and the juxtaposition of examples of racism from the past with those of the achievements in the 
present. Such historical references and images not only obscured continuing institutional racism, racial 
inequality and discrimination, but were challenged by the revival or resurgence of violent organized racism, 
including the Klan itself. On 7 April 2009, the Department of Homeland Security issued the report Right-Wing 
Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fuelling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment,2 
and the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) has reported a significant increase in far-right hate groups and 
racism in the period since Obama’s election and in the context of Donald Trump’s campaign and election.3 
                                                          
1 The Ku Klux Klan is referred to in this chapter by this full name, KKK or Klan. Where a specific organization 
or klavern is being discussed, it will be identified.  
2 United States Department of Homeland Security, Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political 
Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment, 7 April 2009. Online. Available: 
https://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf (accessed 20 March 2017). 
3 D. Holthouse, ‘The year in hate: Number of hate groups tops 900’, Intelligence Report, Spring 2009. Online. 
Available: https://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?aid=1027 (accessed 12 October 2009); 
Hatewatch Staff, ‘Update: More than 400 incidents of hateful harassment and intimidation since the election’, 
What is particularly interesting about this increase is that, while in some cases such developments challenge 
post-racial discourses and narratives, in other cases they are constructed as remnants of the past or the only 
remnants of racism. This is despite examples of continuing inequality and institutional racism in the criminal 
justice system and counter-terrorism and security, and Trump’s exacerbation of both with his attacks on Black 
Lives Matter,4 his ‘Blue Lives Matter’ legislation,5 and ‘Muslim ban.’6 The history of far-right racist terrorism 
was also evoked post-9/11 to challenge often racist representations of Muslims which associated and conflated 
them with terrorism. This occurred again in the wake of the Dylann Roof attack on the Emanuel African 
Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina on 17 June 2015, with the hashtag 
‘#whiteterrorism.’7  
 
 
                                                          
Southern Poverty Law Center, 15 November 2016. Online. Available:  
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the month following the election’, Southern Poverty Law Center, 16 December 2016. Online. Available: 
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(accessed 1 April 2017). 
4 C. Campbell, ‘Donald Trump trashes Black Lives Matter: “I think they're  
Trouble”’, Business Insider, 9 September 2015. Online. Available: http://uk.businessinsider.com/donald-trump-
black-lives-matter-2015-9 (accessed 10 February 2017). 
5 United States Congress, All Bill Information for H.R.4760 - Blue Lives 
Matter Act of 2016, 16 March 2016. Online. Available: https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-
bill/4760/all-info (accessed 20 March 2017). 
6 D. Merica, ‘Trump signs executive order to keep out “radical Islamic terrorists”’, CNN, 30 Jan. 2017. Online. 
Available: http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/27/politics/trump-plans-tosign-executive-action-on-refugees-extreme-
vetting/ (accessed 20 March 2017).  
7 See: https://twitter.com/hashtag/whiteterrorism. See also: A. Winter, ‘White terror: racism and the racialization 
of violence’, Open Democracy, 8 December 2015. Online. Available:  https://www.opendemocracy.net/aaron-
winter/white-terror-racism-and-racialization-of-violence (accessed 20 January 2017). 
This chapter focuses on the ways in which the Klan has been used to signify the history of racism in the United 
States as something at once formerly acceptable or mainstream and at the same time extremist, and on how the 
history of the Klan has been constructed it order to serve that purpose, not just in the current context but 
throughout the history of both the United States and the organization itself. The title of the chapter is a play on 
the way the Klan has been evoked to tell a certain history of racism in the United States and the repeated 
attempts to assert its demise, and alleged consignment to the dustbin of history in order to tell that story. During 
different periods in Klan history, the rise and mainstream power and influence of the organization was defeated 
and diminished or destroyed by the attempted criminalization and political delegitimization of the organization 
by the federal government and law enforcement through legislation, investigations, prosecutions and hearings, 
typically in relation to terrorism and other forms of violence and criminality.8 While such actions were focused 
on terrorism and criminal activities, and in some cases attempted to address the lack of action against the 
organization by law enforcement on a local and state level, they had other functions as well. They were enacted 
primarily when the Klan’s presence and activities were leading to increased negative attention and pressure on 
the federal government and were seen to pose a threat to the peaceful establishment and enforcement of federal 
laws, most notably those concerning racism in the post-Civil War reconstruction and civil rights eras. They were 
also designed to disentangle the Klan from wider civil society and political and legal institutions, including their 
overlap and relationship with state and local political representatives and law enforcement. Such overlap and 
relationships, reveal the blurred boundaries between mainstream and extreme practice and ideology when it 
came to racism, but it is just such a boundary that federal responses to the Klan would erect by intent or effect.  
                                                          
8 The concept of criminalization typically refers to legal activities and those engaging in them becoming 
criminal through changes to the law that render these activities and actors illegal and criminal. It can also refer 
to increased attention on communities or groups by the criminal justice system and legislators, which bring them 
under greater scrutiny and increases the likelihood that they will be arrested, indicted and convicted of criminal 
offenses. This usually implies some sort of disproportionality and injustice, which would not be the case with 
the Klan. In the case of the Klan, their activities were often criminal and tolerated (and they were protected) by 
local and state law enforcement and criminal justice system or their activities were legal because of legal white 
supremacy. What is being referred to as their criminalization is the increased attention by the federal 
government and law enforcement, and the use of new or established resources and legislation, to correct this, 
address their violence and criminality, and as will be examined, serve various political functions.   
  
While legal and formal state racism was the focus of federal legislation in the cases of reconstruction and civil 
rights, the targeting of Klan violence in federal campaigns allowed the organization to become the unacceptable 
face, and even embodiment, of southern racism that could be rejected and expunged, allowing the states and 
civil society in the south to be redeemed and reconstructed. By definition, this approach could not address the 
more systemic forms of racism embedded in institutions and their processes, nor everyday racism. In some 
ways, it stigmatized racist violence, as well as opposition to the federal government, and prioritized national 
unity and security, more than racism. While white southerners did turn away from the Klan because of its 
violence in the 1960s, the focus on violence as opposed to racism more widely meant they were unlikely to 
acknowledge the relationship between their own racism and what the Klan believed, defended and committed 
violence in the name of. Moreover, the placement of such terrorism and terrorist groups, that were white 
Christian, state supportive and stood in defence of the laws of the land, in the past today, allows for a presentist 
and often racist conflation of Islam and terrorism. The confinement of far-right terror to the past coupled with 
the conflation of Islam and terror make it difficult to recognize and reckon with contemporary far-right 
extremism and terror.  
 
 
Andrew Silke has argued that post-9/11 research on terrorism has lacked historical research and focused too 
much on Islamist terror.9 In reference to far-right terror in the United States, it is for these reasons that not only 
is a historical perspective important, but historical memory, processes and representations should also be 
examined to understand how the concept of terrorism (and linked to this, racism) is constructed and deployed, 
and how collective or national historical memory is shaped by and shapes political perceptions and debates in 
the present. In order to do that, this chapter examines the history of the Klan, focusing on three particular eras: 
1. The first era Klan of the post-Civil War reconstruction period (1860s-70s); 2. The second era Klan of the 
nativist period (1910s-20s) and the fascists who followed them (1930s-40s); 3. The third era Klan of the civil 
rights period (1950s-60s). The chapter examines the relationship and overlap between the Klan and mainstream 
                                                          
9 A. Silke, ‘Contemporary terrorism studies: Issues in research’, in R. Jackson, M. Breen-Smyth, and J. Gunning 
(eds.) Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009. 
hegemonic politics, institutions and civil society, as well as the processes of criminalization and delegitimization 
of the Klan for its violence that attempted to disentangle the organization from these and destroy it, including 
anti-Klan legislation, FBI investigations and congressional hearings, most notably in the first and third eras. It 
also looks at how, in the second era and context of the Second World War, the issue and target for the federal 
government moved from the Klan to fascists, from the south to the nation as a whole, and from racism, violence 
and criminality to sedition and national security. These eras and government responses to the Klan and wider 
far-right are also considered in relation to post-racial discourses and historical narratives that followed Obama’s 
election, the revival or resurgence of the Klan and wider far-right in the context of both the post-racial and 
Trump, and debates about the recognition (or lack thereof) of far-right terrorism in American history.  
 
Post-Racial America 
 
On the eve of Obama’s election, former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani stated: ‘we’ve achieved history tonight 
and we’ve moved beyond … the whole idea of race and racial separation and unfairness.’10 Newsweek had 
previously declared ‘The End of the South’ on its cover.11 Just after the election, Richard Cohen wrote in the 
Washington Post: ‘it is not just that he [Obama] is post-racial; so is the nation he is generationally primed to 
lead,’ and quoting former President Lyndon Johnson, who oversaw the passing of the Civil Rights Act, ‘my 
fellow Americans, we have overcome.’ The editorial, which argued that Obama’s election and post-racial 
America are a result of Johnson’s actions and civil rights, was accompanied by an image of police attacking 
voting rights marchers at the Edmund Pettus Bridge, still named after the former Senator and Grand Dragon of 
the Alabama Klan, in Selma on ‘Bloody Sunday’ 7 March 1965.12 The past was frequently evoked and attached 
to Obama in the form of legacy and overcoming. Historian Simon Schama has argued that Obama brought with 
him the ‘honoured ghosts’ of history, most notably the civil rights generation which had the courage ‘to sit at 
lunch counters and brave fire hoses and march through Selma and Montgomery for freedom’s cause.’ Following 
                                                          
10 T. Wise, Between Barack and a Hard Place: Racism and White Denial in the Age of Obama, San Francisco: 
City Lights Books, 2009, p. 26.   
11 C. Dickey, ‘The end of the South: How Obama vs. McCain is unsettling the old confederacy’, Newsweek, 11 
August 2008. 
12 R. Cohen, ‘The election that LBJ won’, Washington Post, 4 November 2008. 
on the issues of generation and the legacy of civil rights, Time magazine’s inauguration preview included the 
article ‘One Dream Realized,’ in which iconic veterans of the civil rights movement, including Democratic 
Congressman from Georgia John Lewis, who had been attacked by the Klan in South Carolina (and elsewhere) 
as a Freedom Rider and injured by police on the Selma to Montgomery voting rights march, spoke about both 
the struggle and Obama’s election.13 In one editorial image, ‘Obama and resigned KKK member’, by Riber 
Hansson, Obama is shown walking up the White House passing a Klansman with his hooded head looking 
downcast and leaning on his cross with a pile of matches on the ground next to him.14 References to slavery, Jim 
Crow segregation and the Klan, as well as other signifiers of historical (and often southern) racism, 
accompanied these and many other post-racial celebrations.15 
 
 
In post-racial discourses and narratives, racism is deemed a thing of the past, eradicated by the forces of 
historical progress and change, and the United States is portrayed as now an equal and colour-blind society. As 
proof of such changes, individual achievement is universalized (e.g. Obama’s election), and discrimination or 
racism is denied, individualized and, where found, is constructed as an aberration, out of place and time. 
According to Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and Victor Ray, most mainstream social analysis and Americans view 
racism as ‘individual-level animosity or hatred towards people of colour,’ and associated primarily with its most 
explicit and historical manifestations or representations, such as ‘Klan rallies or overt racial behaviour like 
hanging a noose from a tree.’16 According to Miri Song, such perspectives bolster the notion that ‘old style’ 
                                                          
13 A. Fetini, et al., ‘One dream realized’, Time: Special Inauguration Preview, 26 January 2009.  
14 R. Hansson, ‘Obama and resigned KKK member’, Cagle Cartoons, 2008. Online. Available: 
http://www.caglecartoons.com/viewimage.asp?ID={8CECA1FF-B1F1-4762-AAAE-EB7E0A9D3A15} 
(accessed 3 August 2017).  
15 C. Dickey, ‘Journey through a troubled South’, Newsweek, 11 August 2008, pp.22-32; Chicago Herald 
Tribune, ‘Election 2008’, Chicago Herald Tribune, 5 November 2008, pp.6-7; USA Today, ‘Reflections on 
living history’, USA Today, 21 January 2009, pp.14a-15a; Newsweek, ‘Commemorative Inaugural Issue’, 
Newsweek, 20 January. 2009.  
16 E. Bonilla-Silva, with V. Ray, ‘Getting over the Obama hope hangover: The new  
racism is a thing from the past.17 Tim Wise argues that Obama’s election did not signify the death of personal or 
institutional white racism but the usurpation of what he terms ‘Racism 1.0,’ namely the ‘old-fashioned bigotry 
… that has long marked the nation’s history: the kind that, in its most extreme moments has precipitated racist 
murder, lynching, and terror on a grand scale,’ with ‘Racism 2.0.’ Wise defines this as ‘enlightened 
exceptionalism, a form that allows for and even celebrates the achievements of individual persons of color.’ 
Wise points out that in addition to this discourse of exceptionalism, underpinned by racist assumptions about 
black people, the old fashioned bigotry of ‘Racism 1.0’ persists and ‘even now animates hate groups and hate 
crimes when taken to its logical conclusion.’18  
 
 
Around the time of the election, there was a flurry of racist far-right activity, including terrorist and other violent 
attacks. In December 2009, less than a month before inauguration, neo-Nazi James G. Cummings III of Belfast, 
Maine was killed by his wife as he was preparing a radioactive ‘dirty bomb’ in order to carry out a terrorist 
attack allegedly planned as a response to Obama’s election.  The other two incidents were clear reminders of 
racist violence of the civil rights era. Just days before the election, an effigy of Obama was hung from a noose in 
a mock lynching at the University of Alabama, and only hours after the election, a black church in Springfield, 
Massachusetts was targeted by arsonists.19  
 
 
Prominent white supremacists issued statements about Obama’s election in relation to historical change and the 
loss of white power in the United States. David Duke, former Grand Wizard of the KKK and director the 
National Association for the Advancement of White People (NAAWP) said ‘I believe tonight is a night of 
                                                          
racism in “post-racial” America’, in K. Murji and J. Solomos (eds.) Theories of Race and Ethnicity: 
Contemporary Debates and Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p.59. 
17 M. Song, ‘Challenging a culture of racial equivalence’, British Journal of Sociology, 65(1), 2014, 107-129. 
18 Wise, Between Barack, pp. 9-10. 
19 L. Keller, ‘White Heat: Racist Backlash Greets New U.S. President’, Intelligence Report, 2009. Online. 
Available: www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?aid=1015 (accessed 19 November 2009). 
tragedy and sadness for our people … The country is not recognizable any more.’20  Thom Robb, national 
director of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, argued: ‘It could mean a reawakening of our spirit and blood. 
Every time the television shows an image of Obama it will be a reminder that our people have lost power in this 
country.’21 Someone posted on the Traditional Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan online forum ‘I consider 
this to be the darkest day in American history since the end of the Civil War.’22 Ray Larsen, Imperial Wizard of 
the National Knights of the Ku Klux Klan called for all Klansmen to wear black armbands and fly the ‘Yankee’ 
(American) flag upside down, a sign of national distress, on the day of Obama’s inauguration.23 Several groups 
claimed a rise in membership after the election, with Jerald O’Brien of Aryan Nations-Church of Jesus Christ 
Christian calling Obama the ‘greatest recruiting tool ever.’24  Duke referred to Obama as a ‘visual aid’ that is 
helping attract interest and recruits, claiming that his own website has seen traffic by ‘unique users’ increase 
from 15,000 to 40,000 a day.25     
 
 
The SPLC reported a four per cent rise in hate groups in the period 2007-8, with over 900 active, a reversal of 
the decline experienced since 2000, which they attributed to Obama’s election and the recession. This rise was 
particularly notable in the south and California, and amongst white supremacists and the Klan.26  Soon after, 
                                                          
20 Southern Poverty Law Center, ‘In their own words: Hating Barack Obama’, Intelligence Report, 2009. 
Online. Available: http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?sid=442&printable=1 (accessed 12 
October 2009). 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid.  
24 UPI, ‘Aryan Nations: Obama recruiting tool’, UPI, 18 April 2009. Online. Available: 
www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/04/18/Aryan-Nations-Obama-recruiting-tool/UPI-80761240108642 (accessed 
19 November 2009); S. Chen, ‘Growing hate groups blame Obama, economy’, CNN, 26 February 2009. Online. 
Available: www.cnn.com/2009/US/02/26/hate.groups.report/index.html (accessed 15 May 2009). 
25 S. Chen, ‘Growing hate groups’.  
26 Holthouse, ‘The year in hate’.  
Homeland Security issued its Rightwing Extremism report.27 Concerns were also expressed by Political 
Research Associates28 and the Anti-Defamation League.29 In 2014, the far-right Sovereign Citizen movement 
was identified by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism as the number 
one terrorist threat to the United States.30 That year also saw a number of high profile armed confrontations and 
violent incidents such as shootings at a Jewish Community Centre and retirement home in Kansas by former 
Klansman Frazier Glenn Miller in April,31 and the June shootings in Las Vegas by anti-government activists 
Jerad and Amanda Miller.32 
 
 
This trend was consolidated with Donald Trump who courted the far-right and racists during his campaign 
through the mobilization of white victimization, scapegoating of Muslims and Mexicans, coded antisemitism, 
and appeals to white nationalism and an idealized past. According to Henry Louis Gates Jr., Trump’s campaign 
and election ‘clearly represented a backlash against the progress black people have made since 1965.’33 Trump 
                                                          
27 United States Department of Homeland Security, Rightwing Extremism. 
28 C. Berlet and Political Research Associates, Toxic to Democracy: Conspiracy Theories, Demonization and 
Scapegoating, June 2010, Online. Available: http://www.politicalresearch.org/resources/reports/full-
reports/toxic-to-democracy/#sthash.ol5EqPTf.dpbs (accessed 12 October 2009). 
29 Anti-Defamation League, ADL Special Reports: Rage Grows in America: Anti-Government Conspiracies, 16 
November 2009. Online. Available: http://www.adl.org/special_reports/rage-grows-in-america/default.asp 
(accessed 23 November 2009).  
30 D. Carter, S. Chermak, J. Carter and J. Drew, Understanding Law Enforcement Intelligence, U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, 2014. Online. Available: 
https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_UnderstandingLawEnforcementIntelligenceProcesses_July2014.pdf 
(accessed 20 March 2017).  
31 E. Fitzsimmons, ‘Man kills 3 at Jewish centers in Kansas City suburb’, New York Times, 13 April 2014. 
32 M. Potok, ‘Alleged Las Vegas cop-killers in “patriot” movement, warned of sacrifices’, Southern Poverty 
Law Center, 9 June 2014. Online. Available: http://www.splcenter.org/blog/2014/06/09/alleged-las-vegas-cop-
killers-in-patriot-movement-warned-of-sacrifices/ (accessed 20 June 2014).  
33 S. Timber, ‘Henry Louis Gates on Trump: “That election clearly represented  
was endorsed by David Duke and the Klan, the American Nazi Party, Aryan Nations, National Alliance, 
Stormfront, The Daily Stormer, Alt-Right leader Richard Spencer, and another rise in hate groups and hate 
crimes was reported.34 The SPLC reported a spike in hate-based harassment and attacks post-election. Between 
9 November 2016, the day after the presidential election, and 14 November, they collected 437 reports of hate 
incidents, and this rose to 1,094 by mid-December.35 They linked the rise in such incidents to Trump’s 
campaign and victory, and noted graffiti reading ‘Make America White Again,’ referencing both the campaign 
slogan and the idealization of the racist past.36 An emboldened white nationalist movement also held rallies in 
                                                          
a backlash against the progress black people have made since 1965”’, Salon, 12 November 2016. Online. 
Available: http://www.salon.com/2016/11/12/henry-louis-gates-on-trump-that-election-clearly-represented-a-
backlash-against-the-progress-black-people-have-made-since-1965/ (accessed 20 March 2017). 
34 D. Neiwert, ‘Right-wing extremists hail the ascension of “emperor Trump”  
as GOP nominee’, Southern Poverty Law Center, 6 May 2016. Online. Available: 
https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/05/06/right-wing-extremists-hail-ascension-%E2%80%98emperor-
trump%E2%80%99-gop-nominee (accessed10 July 2016); D. Neiwert and S. Posner, ‘Meet the horde of Neo-
Nazis, Klansmen, and other extremist leaders endorsing Donald Trump’, Mother Jones, 21 September 2016. 
Online. Available: http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/09/trump-supporters-neo-nazis-white-
nationalists-kkk-militias-racism-hate (accessed 30 September 2016); P. Holley, ‘KKK’s official newspaper 
supports Donald Trump for president’, Washington Post, 1 November 2016; A. Okeowo, ‘Hate on the rise after 
Trump’s election’, The New Yorker, 17 November 2016.  
35 Hatewatch Staff, ‘Update: More than 400 incidents’; Hatewatch Staff, ‘Update: 1094 bias related incidents’. 
36 C. Miller and A. Werner, ‘Ten days after: Harassment and intimidation in the aftermath of the election’, 
Southern Poverty Law Center, 29 November 2016. Online. Available: https://www.splcenter.org/20161129/ten-
days-after-harassment-and-intimidation-aftermath-election (accessed 1 April 2017); A. Winter, Brexit and 
Trump: On Racism, the Far Right and Violence, Institute for Policy Research (IPR) Blog, 2017. Online. 
Available: http://blogs.bath.ac.uk/iprblog/2017/04/03/brexit-and-trump-on-racism-the-far-right-and-violence/ 
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2017, including a Klan rally in defence of confederate monuments on 8 July,37  and a large ‘Unite the Right’ 
rally on 12 August, both in Charlottesville, Virginia.38 Referring to the latter, Duke said:  
 
We are determined to take our country back. We are going to fulfil the promises of Donald Trump. 
That’s what we believed in, that’s why we voted for Donald Trump. Because he said he’s going to 
take our country back.39 
 
During the ‘Unite the Right’, James A. Fields, a white supremacist affiliated with Vanguard America, drove a 
car into a crowd of counter-protestors, killing Heather Heyer and injuring many more.40 Counter-protesters were 
also injured in other violent incidents. In response, Trump issued a statement, but failed denounce the far-right, 
blaming violence ‘on many sides.’41  
 
 
Trump also appointed former Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions to the position of Attorney General. What is 
interesting about this case is that when he was nominated as a Federal District Judge in the 1980s, he was seen 
                                                          
37 Reuters, ‘Ku Klux Klan rally in Virginia’, Reuters, 8 July 2017. Online. Available: 
http://www.reuters.com/news/picture/ku-klux-klan-rally-in-virginia-idUSRTX3AOF8 (accessed 13 August 
2017).  
38 A. Winter, ‘Charlottesville, far-right rallies, racism and relating to power’, Open Democracy, 17 Aug. 2017. 
Online. Available:  https://www.opendemocracy.net/aaron-winter/charlottesville-far-right-rallies-racism-and-
relating-to-power (accessed 18 Aug. 2017). 
39 H. Hanson, ‘Ex-KKK leader David Duke says white supremacists will “fulfill” Trump’s promises’, 
Huffington Post, 12 August 2017.  
40 Hatewatch Staff, ‘Alleged Charlottesville Driver Who Killed One Rallied With Alt-Right Vanguard America 
Group’, Southern Poverty Law Center, 12 Aug. 2017. Online. Available 
https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/08/12/alleged-charlottesville-driver-who-killed-one-rallied-alt-right-
vanguard-america-group (accessed 17 Aug. 2017).  
41 B. Jacobs and W. Murray, ‘Trump under fire after failing to denounce Virginia white supremacists’, The 
Guardian, 13 August 2017.  
by many, including Coretta Scott-King who opposed the appointment in a letter to the Judiciary Committee, as 
racist.42 He had been accused by former subordinate Thomas Figures of calling him ‘boy,’ making disparaging 
comments of civil rights organizations, and positive comments and jokes about the KKK. In his own defence, 
Sessions claimed that he and his office ‘broke the Klan in the heart of Dixie,’ bankrupting the Alabama Klan, 
and secured the conviction and punishment of the two Klan members who lynched Michael Donald in 1981. 
Session’s decisive role in these has been disputed by researchers and others involved.43 Sessions was eventually 
appointed Trump’s Attorney General in an administration that removed the civil rights page from the White 
House website,44 and has been accused of degrading the Department of Justice’s civil rights division and 
threatening civil rights protections.45  
 
 
The past has also returned in another way. Since Trump came into office, the United States has seen an increase 
in incidents of and references to lynching.46 Rep. Al Green (D-Texas) received lynching threats after he called 
for the impeachment of President Trump and on 1 May 2017, the campus of American University saw white 
supremacists put up bananas hanging from nooses in an attempt to intimidate student body president Taylor 
Dumpson. The same month, Mississippi State Representative Karl Oliver, who represents the district where 
                                                          
42 A. Wilts, ‘Jeff Sessions: Man once deemed too racist to be judge set for confirmation as Trump's Attorney 
General’, The Independent, 8 February 2017.  
43 A. Serwer, ‘What Jeff Sessions's role in prosecuting the Klan reveals about his civil-rights record’, The 
Atlantic, 9 January 2017.  
44 J. Ross, ‘Civil rights page also deleted from White House website’, Washington Post, 20 January 2016.  
45 MSNBC, ‘Sessions continues perversion of DoJ's civil rights division’, MSNBC, 1 August 2017. Online. 
Available: http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow/watch/sessions-continues-perversion-of-doj-s-civil-rights-
division-1015131203509 (accessed 2 August 2017) 
46 D. Love, ‘Lynching re-emerges in new rhetoric of hate’, CNN, 23 May 2017. Online. Available: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/23/opinions/stop-mainstream-lynching-opinion-love/ (accessed 5 June 2017). 
Emmett Till was lynched in 1955, called for the lynching of politicians supporting the removal of Confederate 
monuments in Louisiana.47  The monument to Till was also defaced twice in 2017.48  
 
 
The fact that the Klan and other far-right, white supremacist and white nationalist groups, as well as forms of 
(and references to) historical racist violence, have undergone a revival during this period has really challenged 
the post-racial construction of racism as a thing of the past. In fact, even when recognized (and often it is not), 
such a revival may be cast as a historical ghost or remnant, the only remaining manifestation of racism, or a 
backlash predicated on the claim that there has been a historical reversal of the white supremacist racial order. 
The latter would be most accurate, but only if it recognizes the fallacy of the claim that racial power has been 
reversed and acknowledges both that racial inequality and racism have continued on and that such far-right 
groups, although diminished at points, never went away. It is surprising that in a context focused on terrorism, 
the construction of racism as the product of extremists and terrorists in American history and ‘re-emergence’ of 
such movements, would fail to challenge the often racist representations and stereotypes of Muslims as 
terrorists.49 It may be that contemporary cases of far-right extremism and terrorism are too close for comfort and 
too disruptive, while the past is constructed in a convenient manner that does not affect the present. 
Corresponding to the post-racial narrative, partly produced by the criminalization, delegitimization and 
attempted eradication of the Klan at the end of each era, the United States can see itself having overcome not 
only racism but terrorism, and contemporary manifestations of these are the product of individuals who do not 
implicate white America/ns collectively. This is a logic and privilege that is not afforded Muslims and ignores 
not only the links between contemporary far-right activity, Trump’s campaign and election and wider 
mainstream white nationalism, but also the racism that underpins it and never went away.  
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The double standard where Muslims are labelled terrorists and held collectively suspect or accountable and 
white people are not was highlighted in the wake of the shooting at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal 
Church in Charleston, South Carolina by Dylann Roof. Following the attack, social media was full of posts and 
tweets tagged with #whiteterrorism, and asking questions such as why it is not called terrorism when white 
people do it? And why white people are not held to account?50 Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH), also added his 
voice, saying about terrorists: ‘Normally, they look more like me than they look like Middle Easterners … they 
are generally white males, who have shot up people in movie theaters and schools.’51 The New America 
Foundation issued a report based on research into groups ‘engaged in violent extremist activity’ and found that 
white extremists were by far the most dangerous,52 as reported in Time53 Trump failed to acknowledge this in his 
comments on terrorism and froze 10 million in funding going to groups combatting right-wing extremism and 
terrorism, approved by Obama through the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program.54  
 
 
Selective treatment of and historical memory about far-right racist domestic terrorism in the United States, most 
notably its placement in the past or its denial or erasure by the government, media and public began earlier than 
the Obama or Trump eras. In Understanding Terrorism in America, Christopher Hewitt describes the shock and 
surprise the media expressed following 9/11, noting Newsweek’s claim that it ‘rattled the country’s confidence, 
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dispelling the snug illusion that Americans were immune, somehow, to the plague of terrorism ….’55  He then 
turns to Newsweek’s response to the Oklahoma City bombing by militia associate Timothy McVeigh in 1995: 
‘This doesn’t happen here …. It looked like Beirut. But the devastated building was deep in America’s 
heartland, ending forever the illusion that here at home we are safe.’ For Hewitt, the illusion that terrorism in the 
United States is relatively new, continues in the face of historical evidence.56    
 
 
According to data compiled by Hewitt, between 1954, when the Klan re-emerged to oppose desegregation, and 
2000, there were over 3,228 attacks and over 661 fatalities in the U.S. and Puerto Rico.  The category of 
perpetrator that committed the most at 31.2 per cent of terrorist incidents and 51.6 per cent of fatalities, were 
‘White Racist/Rightist.’ These included the bombing of the 16th St. Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama on 
15 September 1963 and the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma on 
19 April 1995. Islamist terrorism, which falls under the category of ‘foreign terrorism’ comes in last after at 1.1 
per cent of incidents and 1.7 per cent of fatalities. Hewitt argues that this is a product of an ignorance of history, 
the ideological diversity of the terrorists, and their fragmented organizational forms.57 What Hewitt does not 
address is the question of why certain groups who may share a group affiliation or identity with a terrorist are 
held to account and others not, and how that association or its denial functions politically, particularly when one 
type of terrorist such as far-right, shares the dominant racial and national identity and mobilizes on its behalf and 
allegedly in defence of the nation (or a region), its history and institutions (e.g. slavery, segregation and white 
supremacy) and the other, such as ‘Islamist’, are linked to a minority and/or foreign group. It is self-serving and 
useful to deny that the former has any links to oneself, its nation and culture and conflate, stereotype and 
scapegoat the latter. An exception is made when the former becomes a scapegoat for racism in order to 
‘overcome’ racism and terrorism, foreclose on this chapter of history and redeem whiteness and the nation. In 
the wake of 9/11, David Farley wrote of this selective history of terror and racist double standard:   
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Even now, while our FBI is arresting anyone whose first name rhymes with Osama, groups like the 
Klan operate openly and legally in all 50 states. Next time you’re in Tennessee… come visit Nathan 
Bedford Forrest Park, named after the founder of America’s al-Qaida, the KKK. Absurdly, we’re 
supposed to breathe a sigh of relief now that we think the anthrax was sent, not by Arabs, but by 
white supremacists… Has U.S. Attorney-General John Ashcroft detained 1,000 Christians without 
charge? Is everyone with links to Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh now under 
surveillance?58  
 
One of the ways that this racist double standard, which ignores white racist terror and targets Muslims, operates 
is through the conflation of racism and terrorism in the past through a process that criminalized the Klan for its 
terrorism and thereby expunged them and exorcized the body politic, neglecting the fact that this racist past lives 
on in American institutions and such groups still exist. It is to that past that I now turn.    
 
 
The Klan in History: Through the Eras 
 
 
The Ku Klux Klan was founded by Nathan Bedford Forrest in Pulaski, Tennessee in 1865 as a social club for 
veterans of the Confederate army and became political in 1868. This period, as the first instantiation of the 
organization, is known as the first era Klan.59 The organization provided an outlet for confederate 
disenchantment and resentment for having lost the Civil War and opposition to the abolition of slavery, made 
law with the passing of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1865, and reconstruction.60 According 
to the Klan’s creed of this period, published in 1867, their stated objective was ‘the maintenance of the 
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supremacy of the White Race in this Republic.’61 The Klan of this period was organized in local or state dens or 
klaverns which were unified as a southern movement in 1868 in order to oppose reconstruction, control free 
black people, police the colour line, disrupt voting efforts, and prevent the enforcement of the equal rights and 
protections set out in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution passed that same year.62  The white 
supremacist, confederate, anti-federal Klan of this period represented mainstream and dominant politics, 
ideology, identity and interests in the south of this period. At its peak, the Klan had 550,000 members in the 
South and 40,000 in Tennessee alone.63 The tactics of the first era Klan were a mix of ritual, intimidation and 
violence and were designed to promote and protect their politics, ideology, identity and interests, and ensure 
they remained dominant. The tactics included  cross burnings, night riding, parades, rallies and protest marches, 
creating the iconic image of the white robed and hooded Klansmen on horses and with burning crosses, as well 
as forms of violence such as lynching, shooting, stabbing, flogging and forced exile.64 These were used to  
intimidate and ‘dispose’ of black people who were viewed as disrespectful, crossed the colour line, engaged in 
activism, attempted to vote, acquired land or prospered, as well as white people and northern ‘carpetbaggers’ 
who aided or supported them and equal rights.65  According to Cox and Durham, such violence and intimidation 
by the Klan ‘almost completely aborted reform in the South.’66  
 
 
By 1869, the Klan was losing favour and becoming a problem for the federal government because of its violence 
and the challenge it presented to reconstruction.67 That year, Forrest called for the dissolution of the Klan, but it 
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remained active.68 In 1870, a federal grand jury labelled the Klan a ‘terrorist organization’, leading to hundreds 
of indictments.69 In 1871, a joint congressional Committee conducted an investigation into Klan violence and 
revealed that during a four-year period, there were hundreds to thousands of deaths of black people (150 in one 
Florida county alone). According to one commanding federal general in Texas, the violence and deaths were so 
‘common,’ ‘as to render it impossible to keep accurate accounts of them.’70 A majority report issued by the 
committee on 19 February 1872, described the Klan as ‘a fearful conspiracy against society, committing 
atrocities and crimes that richly deserve punishment.’71 The previous year, Congress passed The Enforcement 
Act of 1871, also known as the Third Enforcement Act, Federal Force Act and Ku Klux Klan Act. It was 
intended to aid and enforce reconstruction by combatting the denial of, and threats to, the equal rights and 
protections in the Fourteenth Amendment by the states and Klan. The Act made a number of the Klan's tactics 
into federal offenses and authorized President Ulysses S. Grant to suspend habeas corpus in order to send troops 
in to suppress Klan intimidation and violence.72 This led to mass arrests, convictions and, by 1872, the end of 
the first era Klan.73  Soon after, The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was passed, yet racism and white supremacy 
remained. Following the passing of the Civil Rights Act, southern states passed segregationist Jim Crow laws.74  
When segregation came before the federal Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896, it was ruled that 
segregated ‘separate but equal’ facilities were not violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition to the 
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emergence of new forms of legal racism and despite the dissolution of the first era Klan, between 1885 and 
1917, there were 2,734 lynchings.75    
  
 
The actions of the federal government not only failed to destroy legal and extrajudicial racism and white supremacy 
during reconstruction, they also failed to destroy the Klan itself permanently. In fact, a congressional report on the 
Klan in the third era discussed the violence of the Klan during the first era and the political response.76 Even closer 
to the demise of the first era Klan, in the early 1900s, when the organization was no longer a focus of attention or 
significant political presence, it underwent a process of mythologization and whitewashing (to use a term that truly 
represents their racial politics as well as the process), which set the stage for a revival. Between 1902 and 1907, 
Thomas Dixon Jr, a writer and North Carolina Democrat State Legislator whose father Thomas Dixon Sr had been in 
the Klan during the first era, published his reconstruction trilogy: The Leopard's Spots (1902), The Clansman (1905) 
and The Traitor (1907). President Woodrow Wilson, elected in 1912, even praised the Klan for help saving the south 
from black rule during reconstruction.77 In 1915, D.W. Griffith made the film Birth of a Nation based on The 
Clansman.78 The book and film celebrate the Klan as heroes in the birth of the nation and white masculinity, the 
defenders of southern culture against the north, and protectors of white femininity in the face of freed former slaves. 
The second era began the same year as the film was released.79 It was founded in 1915 in Georgia by ‘Colonel’ 
William Joseph Simmons. The Klan’s ‘Kreed’ of this era stated as its objective ‘uniting native-born white Christians 
for concerted action in the preservation of American institutions and the supremacy of the white race.’80 Despite the 
source material and southern origins, according to David Chalmers, it was in 1917, when the United States entered 
the first world war, that the Klan really found their purpose in the wave of nativism, known as 100 per cent 
Americanism, that emerged. The Klan positioned themselves as defenders of the nation from within against 
immigrant ‘aliens,’ Jews, Catholics, communists, strike leaders, slackers, drugs, bootlegging, graft, sex, immorality 
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and other forces it saw as threatening white America.81 Where the second era differed from the first era, was that it 
was national, as opposed to a regional movement, and mainstream, popular and influential on a state and federal 
level. It was during this era that Fred Trump is alleged to have been arrested during a Klan rally in 1927.82 
 
 
In 1921, President Harding and the Justice Department considered Klan violence and vigilantism a problem for the 
individual States to deal with, but felt pressure to address it. A Congressman from Massachusetts introduced a 
resolution that the Klan had violated the first, fourth, fifth, sixth and thirteenth amendments, impinged on religious 
freedom and prohibitions against illegal seizure, trial, punishment and involuntary servitude, as well as committed 
tax evasion.83 Yet, southern elected officials defended the Klan when the House of Representatives in Washington 
investigated Simmons that year,84 and their power, influence and legitimacy would grow, unlike in the first era. At 
the peak of the second era in 1925, the Klan had up to five million members.85 On 8 August 1925, more than 50,000 
members of the Klan marched on Washington, D.C.86 and Texas Klansman Earl Mayfield was elected to the U.S. 
Senate. Most significantly, Congress passed the Klan-supported 1924 Johnson-Reed Act, which limited immigration 
and introduced permanent restrictions designed to keep out southern and eastern Europeans, particularly Italians and 
Jews, Africans and those from the Middle East, as well as barring Asian immigration.87 Jeff Sessions expressed 
support and admiration for this Act in reference to contemporary concern about immigration in a 2015 interview 
with Stephen Bannon of Breitbart, and later Trump’s Chief Strategist.88 The Klan went into relatively quick decline, 
experiencing a 60 per cent drop in membership from 5,000,000 to 2,000,000 in 1927, to 350,000 in 1928 and 35,000 
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in 1930.89 This decline was a result of a number of factors, including internal divisions, revelations about their 
violence and the 1925 conviction of Indiana Klansman David Stephenson for the murder of a woman he raped, 
which damaged the Klan’s reputation and removed its respectability amongst members, the political class and wider 
society.90 While the full force of the government was not used against the second era Klan, it would be against their 
successors.  
 
 
The diminished Klan was replaced in significance soon after by anti-semitic, pro-nazi fascists, such as the German-
American Bund and Silver Shirts. The Silver Shirts were formed by William Dudley Pelley in 1933 when Hitler 
became Chancellor and inspired by the Brown Shirts.91 In addition to the fascists, this period also saw the emergence 
of depression-era populists, such as the Union Party, which was formed in 1936 by Father Charles Coughlin, Francis 
Townsend and Gerald L. K. Smith, who was also a member of the Silver Shirts. The fascist organizations intersected 
with the wider non-interventionist America First movement, which Trump evoked when describing himself and his 
foreign policy as ‘America First’ on the campaign trail,92 and experienced a period of growth and prominence 
through the 1930s. The high point for the fascists was on 20 February 1939, when the German-American Bund 
hosted a ‘Pro-American Rally’ with 22,000 people at Madison Square Gardens.93 Government concern about fascism 
in the United States, and what Leo Ribuffo has termed the anti-fascist ‘brown scare,’94 began earlier. In 1934, the 
House of Representatives created a Special Committee on Un-American Activities to look into the rise of fascism. 
The same year, President Franklin Roosevelt reversed a 1924 ban on countersubversive probes and directed the FBI 
to investigate fascists. At the same time, there was a growth in anti-fascist activism and campaigns led by Jewish, 
left-wing and anti-racist organizations and activists. The Special Committee on Un-American Activities’ 
recommendations led to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (the McCormack Act). The representation of 
                                                          
89 Cox and Durham, ‘The politics of anger’. 
90 Ibid.; Rothman, ‘When bigotry paraded’; Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 2007, pp.171-4 
91 Cox and Durham, ‘The politics of anger’; Ridgeway, Blood in the Face.  
92 L. Rothman, ‘The long history behind Donald Trump's “America First” foreign policy’, Time, 28 March 2016. 
93 Berlet and Lyons, Right-Wing Populism, p. 151. 
94 L. Ribuffo, The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the Great Depression to the Cold War, 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983, p. xiii. 
fascists, not necessarily as American, but as a foreign ‘fifth column’, was central to the government response. In 
1938, a second special committee was established. It was led by Democrat Martin Dies, a segregationist on good 
terms with the Klan, who would urge Imperial Wizard James Colescott to get ‘back to the original objectives of the 
Klan.’ With the outbreak of war, Roosevelt ordered the FBI to investigate ‘matters relating to espionage, sabotage, 
and violations of the neutrality regulations’ and in 1940 Congress passed the Alien Registration Act (the Smith Act), 
which included sedition provisions and mass registration of foreigners.95 The attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941 and 
American entry into the second world war led to a crackdown on fascists who became the targets of federal 
investigations and criminal prosecutions.96 One notable example of this was when Pelley was charged with and 
convicted of treason and sedition under the Espionage Act in 1942 for distributing information aimed at subverting 
the U.S. armed forces.97 There was also a mass sedition trial of suspected fascists from 1942 to 1944.98 What is 
particularly notable about this time and response, is that far from rejecting the xenophobia and racism of the fascists 
and Klan, the federal government not only targeted foreigners, but also stirred up fear and hatred of the Japanese and 
presided over the racist mass internment of Japanese Americans. In this era, it was the fascists and not the traditional 
Klan who were criminalized, politically delegitimized and defeated by the government, who would then turn their 
attention to communists and wider left, as well as anti-racist organizations and activists, during the ‘red scare.’ The 
Klan would be back though, when the battle over southern racism returned in the 1950s.     
 
 
The most iconic period of Klan history, that was most frequently evoked in the wake of Obama’s election and in 
post-racial discourses and narratives as representative of ‘old fashioned’ racism, was the third era. This era 
covered the period from battles over desegregation in 1950s to civil rights in the 1960s. While the Klan are 
widely viewed as extremists and terrorists today, and were undoubtedly violent, they were also deeply 
intertwined with mainstream society, politics, laws and institutions, blurring the boundary between the 
mainstream and extreme, particularly where it concerns racism  
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In Christopher Hewitt’s nine waves of American domestic terrorism, the first wave occurred between 1954 and 
1969 and centred around white supremacist opposition to desegregation and civil rights in the south, and was 
dominated by the Ku Klux Klan and the National States Rights Party. During this period, which peaked in 1964, 
there were approximately 588 incidents, including bombings, lynchings, shootings, assaults and intimidation, 
with sixty-five fatalities, according to Christopher Hewitt.99  Michael Cox and Martin Durham put the number 
of incidents by the Klan and other white supremacist organizations at over 1000 between 1956 and 1966.100 The 
violence was primarily targeted at black citizens and political desegregation and civil rights activists within civil 
society, while political strategies targeted elected officials and institutions, making use of democratic institutions 
and processes such as (occasionally successful) electoral campaigning and lobbying. That is because in this era, 
the Klan were on the side of politics and law enforcement, defending and enforcing laws and institutions such as 
segregation and white supremacy, and opposing threats to these from those who crossed the colour line, civil 
rights activists, federal desegregation, civil rights and voting rights. Unlike the first era, which was reacting to 
post-Civil War emancipation and reconstruction, the third era was defending a racial, social and political order 
that was still in power.  
 
 
The Klan’s identification with and defence of American institutions, including the law, can best be summed up by the 
following statements published in the American Klansman in 1952:  
 
…. We recognize our relation to the Government of the United States of America, the Supremacy of 
its Constitution, the Union of States thereunder, and the Constitutional Laws thereof, and we shall be 
ever devoted to the sublime principles of a pure Americanism and valiant in the defense of its ideals 
and institutions…101    
 
                                                          
99 Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism. 
100 Cox and Durham, ‘The politics of anger’. 
101 Ku Klux Klan, ‘The Ku Klux Kreed’, The American Klansman, January 1952, p.14.   
We will not compromise or temporize on the question of patriotism or one’s duty as a worthy citizen. 
This is a country of Laws, American Laws, observance of which, alone, will preserve our 
Democracy…102 
 
Yet, the Klan did not just defend laws and political institutions, it stood side by side with, supported and were 
represented by the latter in the name of the law, particularly when the law was subject to change, such as the 
1954 Supreme Court case Brown vs. Board of Education which ended school segregation. In response to this, 
not only did the Klan mobilize, but White Citizens’ Councils were formed by prominent community members, 
to prevent desegregation.103 On a more official level, in 1957, when black students attempted to integrate 
schools in Little Rock, Arkansas, they were turned away not by hooded Klansmen, but National Guardsmen 
under the direction of Governor Orval Faubus. President Eisenhower called in one thousand federal troops to 
integrate the school, and the Supreme Court ruled against the school board’s request for a postponement, Faubus 
responded by closing high schools for a full year.104  
 
 
In the 1960s as desegregation was the law and civil rights and then voting rights became prospects, Klan activism and 
membership grew. By the end of 1960, Klan membership rose four- to five-fold to between 40,000 and 50,000.105 The 
Klan also increasingly overlapped and intersected with the State and local government officials and law enforcement, 
and their activities, during this period.  Their relationship went beyond shared interests, ideology and objectives, and 
included violence which was on the rise. The Klan actively supported local and state law enforcement and elected 
officials, received support and protection from them, acted as enforcers and included such figures amongst their ranks, 
not necessarily covertly. The state also sanctioned and violence, particularly by law enforcement, in concert with and 
without the Klan. According to Chalmers, Klan violence had ‘what amounted to general immunity from arrest, 
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prosecution, and conviction.’106 Testifying before the U.S. Senate, former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach 
discussed the ‘unique difficulty’ in Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana of ‘gathering information on fundamentally 
lawless activities which have the sanction of local law enforcement agencies, political officials and a substantial 
segment of the white population.’107 This is where the distinction between the violence of extremism and rational and 
legitimate legal and political practice falls apart, and the federal government’s attempt to combat the Klan and 
disentangle it from institutions and wider society to aid enforcement of its laws and reconstruction became both 
necessary and difficult.  
 
 
In 1960, the National States’ Rights Party attempted to draft Governor Faubus for a presidential campaign. When 
buses of Freedom Riders arrived in Birmingham on May 14, 1961, the Klan were waiting for them, but Eugene ‘Bull’ 
Connor, City Commissioner in charge of the Birmingham Police Department, provided no police protection and were 
on the receiving end of an attack by the Klansmen.108 In 1963, during a civil rights protest from 2-10 May when the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference's (SCLC) Birmingham Campaign marched through the city, Connor 
authorized and encouraged the police to use force.109 1963 also saw two major violent incidents linked to the Klan: the 
assassination of NAACP field secretary Medgar Evers on 12 June, and bombing of the 16th St. Baptist Church  in 
Birmingham, Alabama which killed four young black girls,  Addie Mae Collins, Carol Denise McNair, Carole 
Robertson and Cynthia Wesley, on 15 September. Perhaps the most notorious case of violence and overlap between 
the Klan and the State, specifically law enforcement, was the 21 June 1964 murders of civil rights workers James Earl 
Chaney, Andrew Goodman and Michael Schwerner in Mississippi. The accused were members of the Klan, and 
employees of both the Neshoba County Sheriff's Office and Police Department. Sheriff Lawrence Rainey was a 
member, as was Deputy Sheriff of Neshoba County Cecil Price. Less than a month later, on 11 July, 9 days after the 
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passing of the Civil Rights Act, Col Lemuel Augustus Penn, Assistant Superintendent of Washington, D.C. public 
schools, was murdered by the Klan in Georgia.110   
 
 
The following year, during the Selma to Montgomery voting rights march, state police, under the orders of 
Alabama Highway Patrol Chief Col. Al Lingo, as well as a Sheriff’s posse, under the leadership of Dallas 
County Sheriff James Gardner Clark, attacked 525 civil rights activists in Selma on their way to the state capital 
Montgomery. The march was organized to promote black voter registration and to protest the killing of Jimmie 
Lee Jackson, by a state trooper during a February 18th voter registration march.111 This was state violence in 
police uniform as opposed to hooded Klan robes. Clark had also recruited Klansmen to prevent voter drives in 
1964 and 1965.112 Soon after this incident, the Klan murdered activist Viola Liuzzo following a voting rights 
march in Alabama on March 25th. According to Chalmers, the murders were initially helpful in bolstering the 
organization’s image and reputation for taking action, as well as increasing its membership. But, by the mid-
1960s, ‘Klan violence had become too reckless to be ignored’ and many feared a return to the violence of the 
desegregation era.113  
 
 
There was a great deal of pressure and frustration at the federal level, not only because of the violence, but the lack of 
action by local and state law enforcement and the courts, including the failure of Mississippi Federal District Judge 
Harold Cox to indict in United States vs Price in 1964-5. That said, it was also clear that Klan violence was not only 
leading to pressure on the federal government in the North, but turning the tide of southern white opinion.114 One of 
the most influential cases were the  murders of Chaney, Goodman and Schwerner which took place eleven days prior 
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to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act on 2 July. According to released FBI files ‘Klan-produced anarchy and the 
possible employment of federal troops helped the Mississippi establishment minimally come to terms with the civil 
rights revolution’. According to Chalmers ‘The story of the 1960s was one of how Klan clubs, bombs, and bullets 
made a major unintended contribution to the civil rights revolution.’115 Combatting the Klan was also an opportunity 
for the federal government.  
 
 
Klan violence in Mississippi, including the Chaney, Goodman and Schwerner case, led President Lyndon Johnson and 
Attorney General Robert Kennedy to demand FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover take action in 1964.116 This was not 
without its challenges. Hoover was more concerned about the alleged link between communism and civil rights, which 
he saw as part of the ‘red agenda,’ which was the FBI’s chief concern. The FBI recognized that the Klan was 
reactionary, but largely ‘supportive of existing power structures and traditional American values’, patriotic, anti-
communist and opposed to the civil rights movement, thus a great deal of overlap with the FBI.117 In fact, the FBI’s 
Internal Security Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO), which would be used against the Klan, was 
established in 1956 during the cold war to combat communism, and had investigated civil rights leaders and 
organizations for alleged links to communism. Hoover had stated that the FBI shouldn’t spend time ‘investigating 
murders, lynchings, and assaults, particularly in the Southern states’. In addition to this, according to Chalmers, 
‘Bureau agents in the South were white Southerners working closely with local police forces that were often 
sympathetic if not infested with Klan members.’118 
 
 
In response to pressure from the Johnson administration, Hoover took action. In 1964, the FBI opened its first field 
office in Mississippi, partly taking control from southern field operatives,119 and rolled out COINTELPRO’s ‘White 
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Hate Groups’ Programme.120 At this point, Hoover argued that the government could ‘take advantage of our experience 
with a variety of sophisticated techniques successfully applied against the Communist Party U.S.A.’121 COINTELPRO 
was designed to ‘expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize.’122 In a statement, COINTELPRO 
declared:  
 
We intend to expose to public scrutiny the devious manoeuvres and duplicity of the hate groups; to frustrate 
any efforts of plans they may have to consolidate their forces; to discourage their recruitment of new or 
youthful adherents; and to disrupt or eliminate their efforts to circumvent the law.123  
 
There techniques included: surveillance, use of informants, theft of Klan records, planting fake news stories rumours 
and anonymous letters revealing Klan and National States Rights Party membership and accusing leaders of 
drunkenness, adultery and misuse of funds and being FBI informants.124 By the 1970s, the FBI claimed one in seven 
Klan members worked for them as informants. According to informant Gary Rowe, who testified in the case of Viola 
Liuzzo, informants were involved in beatings, possibly murders, and the 1963 16th St. Baptist church bombing.125  
 
 
In addition to COINTELPRO and in the field law enforcement and counter-subversion, in response partly to the murder 
of Liuzzo and wider violence, President Johnson called for Congressional hearings into the Klan, in which the FBI 
supplied information from their investigations.126 The Committee On Un-American Activities, House of 
Representatives (HUAC) hearings, Activities Of Ku Klux Klan Organizations In The United States, which focused on 
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terrorism as well as wider violence and criminality, ran from 1965 to 1967.127 It produced the report The Present-day 
Ku Klux Klan Movement and condemned the Klan as un-American.128 According to the report: 
 
Klans …have continued to rely on terrorism as an instrument for achieving so-called “white 
supremacy” and other objectives. This terrorism runs the gamut from telephoned threats or 
intimidatory cross-burnings to various forms of physical violence. Klan involvement in kidnappings 
and beatings, arson, bombings, and outright murder in recent years compels the committee to view a 
klan as a vehicle for death, destruction, and fear.129  
 
A study of the evidence amassed during the committee's investigation leads to the conclusion that 
klans and their leaders actually incite disrespect for the law and encourage acts of violence.130 
 
The report noted that legislative hearings on bills to curb ‘klan-type excesses’ were held in July 1966. The 
Organizational Conspiracies Act was intended to curb or end terrorist activities used by the Klan. It failed and 
was reintroduced as H.E. 7025, the Organizational Conspiracies Act of 1967, but received no support.131 The 
choice of the term ‘excesses’ is revealing though. It implied that the Klan went too far, but was not necessarily 
illegitimate or wrong in their wider politics and ideology or assessment of the situation.    
 
 
Over the next number of year, there were an increasing number of positive developments. The Klan was 
removed from the Highway Patrol in Mississippi, and local Sheriffs and police demonstrated a willingness to 
work with the FBI against the Klan. The murder of Mississippi NAACP chapter Vernon Dahmer in January 
1966, led Governor Johnson to publicly denounce his killers as ‘vicious and morally bankrupt killers.’132 On 
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appeal, Cox's decision in the original murder case was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1966 and there 
were convictions for Price and others in 1967. Although, it would take until 2005 for the conviction of former 
Klansman Edger Killen in the case.133 
 
 
Throughout the ‘White Hate Groups’ programme, there were 455 actions.134 Despite the activity, there were 
significant exceptions to the program. COINTELPRO sought only to focus on violent groups and not those that 
were ‘small, inactive, and peaceful.’135 In fact, Dargan Frierson, a Greensboro special agent whose grandfather 
had been a slaveowner and Klansman, stated that his officers felt ‘the klan itself was perfectly permissible to 
join – but let’s not have violence,’136 highlighting that racism was not the issue and it was only violence that was 
the problem and delegitimizing. COINTELPRO was disbanded in 1971 following the release of the Pentagon 
Papers which revealed the extent to which espionage by them was conducted and gathered intelligence on 
Americans, including the Black Panthers and revolutionary left in the late 1960s and start of the 1970s.137 In 
1974, the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities (Church Committee) investigated COINTELPRO and, in 1975, declared it illegal and 
unconstitutional.138  In addition to this, COINTELPRO is widely seen to have been politically motivated and 
undemocratic, and used to suppress, criminalize and delegitimize political protest and speech.139 The 
combination of COINTELPRO and HUAC hearings, as well as popular opinion and changing times, forced the 
Klan into decline. They experienced a drop in membership from 40,000 to 50,000 at their peak between 1960 
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and 1967 to less than 10,000 between 1967 and 1974. The Klan had been defeated again, but that would not be 
the end of the story.   
 
 
As much as the criminalization and delegitimization of the Klan helped defeat the organization and allow for the 
more peaceful enforcement of civil rights and voting rights, albeit without defeating racism or white supremacy, 
as with the emergence of the second and third eras, it was not long until there was yet another revival. The 
combination of Civil Rights and Voting Rights, COINTELPRO and HUAC were seen by the Klan as evidence 
of both their persecution by the federal government and the final loss of white supremacy that they had 
dedicated themselves to defending and maintaining. In response, the organization retreated to the political 
wilderness and underwent a split. From the mid-1970s, David Duke pursued a mainstreaming strategy, largely 
following his predecessors’ non-violent electoral tactics and running for office. His campaigns included a 
successful run for the Louisiana House of Representatives in 1989 and unsuccessful presidential primary 
campaigns in 1988 and 1992.140 This, along with a revival of Klan protest and media based activism, is 
sometimes referred to as the fourth era. Yet, most followed the more radical path expressed by Texas Klansman 
Louis Beam Jr.in his call-to-arms ‘where ballots fail, bullets will prevail.’141 This was a rejection of the Klan’s 
mainstream tactics in favour of more violent and insurgent ones, which defined the fifth era in the late 1970s to 
the 1990s.142   This era saw the traditional robed Klan replaced by Klan paramilitaries, including Beam’s Texas 
Emergency Reserve and Glenn Miller’s White Patriot Party, the neo-nazism of National Alliance, White Aryan 
Resistance and Aryan Nations, anti-government patriotism and white separatism. Beam, who joined Aryan 
Nations, also wrote, in stark contrast to the Klan’s third era Kreed: ‘Political, economic, religious, and ethnic 
conditions in the United States have reached the point where patriots are faced with a choice of rebellion or 
departure.’143 The era saw a great deal of violence, culminating in the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City on 19 April 1995 by Timothy McVeigh. Pre-9/11, this was the largest terrorist 
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attack on American soil. In response, five Senate sub-committee hearings were held in 1995: Combating 
Domestic Terrorism, The Militia Movement in the United States, The Nature and Threat of Violent Anti-
Government Groups in America, The Federal Raid on Ruby Ridge, ID., and The Activities of Federal Law 
Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians. This was another era and another round of hearings 
designed to address not racism but terrorism and, this case, primarily terrorism which targeted the government 
itself.   
 
 
Despite all the attention the far-right was getting leading up to Oklahoma City and the rich history of far-right 
terrorism in the United States in and well before the fifth era, the perpetrator was initially assumed to be Muslim 
by many in law enforcement and the media.144 The Oklahoma City bombing and wider far-right terrorism, if not 
terrorism on American soil itself, would be forgotten again following 9/11 as mentioned earlier, when Islam 
became conflated with and code for terrorism, so much so that few paid attention when Aryan Nations and 
others called for an alliance with al Qaeda.145 The Oklahoma City bombing itself, but not the Klan of the past, 
would be forgotten again when Obama was elected and the third era Klan became a signifier for the racism of 
old that the United States had overcome, at least until the current revival and resurgence.  
 
 
To conclude, it is clear that not only did the criminalization and political delegitimization of the Klan not work 
to kill it off, but in some cases, it became a rationale and fodder for a revival and even radicalization. Moreover, 
it failed to deal with racism and prevented the nation from dealing with its history of racism and terrorism.  
What the history of the Klan, and responses to it show is how permeable and shifting the boundaries have been 
historically between extremist and violent and mainstream, legal and state-sanctioned racisms. 
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